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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-JURISDICTION OF STATE COURT OVER
NONRESIDENT ToRTFEASOR-The defendant, a resident of Wisconsin, was
engaged in the business of selling appliances and sent one of his employees
to deliver a gas cooking stove to the plaintiff in Illinois. Claiming that the
employee had negligently injured him in unloading the stove, the plaintiff brought action in Illinois, seeking damages of $7,500. A summons was
personally served on the defendant in Wisconsin, and the defendant appeared specially, moving to quash the summons on the ground that the
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Illinois statute,1 providing for extraterritorial service on any person who
commits a tortious act within the state, contravened the constitutions of
the United States and Illinois. The lower court granted the motion quashing the service of summons. On appeal, held, reversed. The statute is not
unconstitutional in authorizing service outside the state for a single tortious
act committed within the state. Nelson v. Miller,2 (Ill. 1957) 143 N.E. (2d)
673.
The traditional basis of state jurisdiction over the person was physical
power and was considered a prerequisite to a valid judgment.3 In response,
however, to a changing economic climate, the Supreme Court indulged in
a number of fictional concepts concerning corporations, moving from the
early view that a corporation could not be sued outside the state in which
it was chartered4 to the later "consent" 5 and "presence" 6 theories which
were devised to avoid the difficulties of the power theory of jurisdiction.
In regard to jurisdiction over nonresident7 individuals, similar departures

1 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1957) c. II0, §§16, 17. Sec. 17 (I) is as follows: "(I) Any person, whether
or not a citizen or resident of this State, who in person or through an agent does any of
the acts hereinafter enumerated, thereby submits said person, and, if an individual, his
personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State as to any cause of
action arising from the doing of any of said acts: (a) The transaction of any business
within this State; (b) The commission of a .tortious act within this State; (c) The ownership, use, or possession of any real estate situated in this State; (d) Contracting to insure
any person, property, or risk located within this State at the time of contracting."
2 The court was initially faced with defendant's contention that because the cause
of action arose before the effective date of the statute it could not constitutionally apply
to him. The court concluded, however, that retroactive application was possible since
extension of jurisdiction under the statute did not rest upon the implied consent of the
defendant. The court further stated that the application of the statute to the defendant
was not a violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since there
was no creation of new liability for past acts, the statute relating only to procedure.
Principal case at 675-676. Compare Ogdon v. Gianakos, 415 Ill. 591, II4 N.E. (2d) 686
(1953) with Gillioz v. Kincannon, 213 Ark. 1010 at 1018, 208 S.W. (2d) 997 (1948). See
McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., (U.S. 1957) 26 U.S. Law Week 4073 at 4074, holding
that retroactive application of a similar statute does not impair the obligation of contracts, as it did not affect substantive rights.
3 Dodd, "Jurisdiction in Personal Actions," 23 Ill. L. Rev. 427 (1929). This view was
reasserted by Justice Holmes when he stated that the "foundation of jurisdiction is
physical power," McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 at 91 (1917). This concept had previously been elevated to a constitutional status under the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). However, a recent discussion of the
physical power doctrine suggests that it was not in fact derived from a common law
background as previously expounded. Ehrenzweig, "The Transient Rule of Personal
Jurisdiction: the 'Power' Myth and Forum Conveniens," 65 YALE L. J. 289 (1956).
4See GoonRicH, CONFLICT oF LAws, 3d ed., 209 (1949). See also Bank of Augusta v.
Earle, 13 Pet. (38 U.S.) 519 (1839).
Ii Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18 How. (59 U.S.) 404 (1855). See Conn. Mutual
Life Ins. Co. v. Spratley, 172 U.S. 602 (1899).
6 International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914). See Bank of America
v. Whitney Central Nat. Bank, 261 U.S. 171 (1923); Philadelphia &: Reading Ry. Co. v.
McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264 (1917).
7 As to resident defendants, the crumbling of the power theory is illustrated by a
case in which domicile in the state was alone considered sufficient to bring an absent
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from the power theory were signalled by cases involving nonresident motorist statutes8 and nonresidents engaged in state-regulated securities transactions.9 With this background of fictive analysis of state jurisdiction as
illustrated by decisions involving both corporations and individuals, a
more practical concept was developed in International Shoe Co. v. Washington.10 The Court explicitly discarded the "consent"11 and "presence"
theories for a less mechanical and more flexible concept which stressed a
test of reasonableness and fairness, balancing the inconvenience of a suit
to the defendant against the necessity of protecting the residents of the
state.12 The question left unanswered by International Shoe is whether
a single act within the state is a sufficient basis for jurisdiction when it is
neither dangerous nor one which the state has a particular interest in
regulating. 13 While dicta in that case suggests that it is not,14 the result
in the principal case is to be preferred. The tort allegedly committed in
Illinois would seem to be a sufficient "minimum contact" with that state
to bring the "fairness" test of International Shoe into play.15 Moreover,
while the Supreme Court decisions finding jurisdiction over nonresidents
based on operation of automobiles, 16 sale of securities,17 and sale of
insurance18 can be explained as based on dangerous acts or ones which
defendant within the reach of the state's jurisdiction. Milliken v. Meyer, Admx., 3ll U.S.
457 (1940).
Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935). Compare Flexner v.
Farson, 248 U.S. 289 (1919).
10 326 U.S. 310 (1945). Although this case dealt with the activities of a foreign corporation within the state, the language is sufficiently broad to indicate that it would
also apply to the activities of individuals. Cleary and Seder, "Extended Jurisdictional
Bases for the Illinois Courts," 50 N.W. UNIV. L. REv. 599 at 603 (1955); note, 16 UNIV.
CHI. L. REv. 523 at 534 (1949).
11 See also Olberding v. Illinois Central R. Co., 346 U.S. 338 at 341 (1953), soundly
criticizing the "consent" theory where nonresident motorist statute and question of venue
in the federal courts were involved.
12This test of fairness may be no easier in its application than the "presence" theory,
but at least it places the determination of jurisdiction on a more realistic basis.
13 See, generally, note, "Single Act Statutes and Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations," 43 VA. L. REv. 1105 (1957).
14 "Finally, although the commission of some single or occasional acts of the corporate
agent in a state sufficient -to impose an obligation or liability on the corporation has not
been thought to confer upon the state authority to enforce it . . . other such acts,
because of their nature and quality and the circumstances of their commission, may be
deemed sufficient to render the corporation liable to suit. . • ." (emphasis added). International Shoe Co. v. Washington, note IO supra, at 318.
15 See Cleary and Seder, "Extended Jurisdictional Bases for the Illinois Courts," 50
N.W. Umv. L. REV. 599 at 607 (1955); Joiner, "Let's Have Michigan Torts Decided in
Michigan Courts," 31 MICH. STATE B. J. 5 at IO Gan. 1952).
16 Kane v. New Jersey, Hess v. Pawloski, note 8 supra.
17 Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, note 9 supra.
18 Travelers Health Assn. v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950). The Court's recent decision
in McGee v. Intl. Life Ins. Co., note 2 supra, was not based on any special state interest
in regulating insurance and probably represents the final extension of Pennoyer v. Neff.
In the McGee case it was held that California could exert jurisdiction over a Texas in.
8
9
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the state has a particular interest in regulating, 19 other courts have found
the commission of a tort20 or the making of a contract21 sufficient, and
these cases cannot be explained on any such basis. They seem proper because the degree to which a nonresident's activity endangers the inhabitants
of Illinois would not seem to be the controlling factor in determining the
fairness of subjecting the nonresident to suit.22 The extent of contact the
defendant had with the state, the benefit and protection he derived
from the laws of the state, the relative extent of his inconvenience,23
the location of the witnesses, and the law which will govern in determining
liability, more than the degree of danger involved in the nonresident's
activity, would seem to be some of the relevant factors in determining
the fairness and reasonableness of extending jurisdiction to cover the defendant.24 Moreover, just as the above factors should determine the due
process question, they also bear on the convenience of the forum, 25 and any
case in which due process would be found would also be a case which would
most conveniently be tried in Illinois. Since plaintiff's claim was apparently
in good faith for a substantial sum, since defendant resided in an adjoining state,26 since part of his income was derived from sales in Illinois,
since Illinois law would control, and since all witnesses except the employee
would presumably be Illinois residents, both due process and convenience
would seem to be satisfied by Illinois suit against this nonresident.

surance company whose sole contact with California was to issue an insurance policy
to one of its residents.

19 Dubin v. Philadelphia, 34 Pa. D. &: C. 61 (1938) (ownership of property) can also
be explained on this basis. See also Peters v. Robin Air Lines, 281 App. Div. 903, 120
N .Y.S. (2d) 1 (1953) (operation of aircraft).
20 Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A. (2d) 664 (1951). See also
Gillioz v. Kincannon, note 2 supra. But see Johns v. Bay State Abrasive Products Co.,
(D.C. Md. 1950) 89 F. Supp. 654, where the court felt it was necessary to find more than
a single isolated act unless the single act was subject to the police power.
21 Compania de Astral, S. A. v. Boston Metals Co., 205 Md. 237, 107 A. (2d) 357 (1954),
cert. den. 348 U.S. 943 (1955).
22 In Davis-Wood Lumber Co. v. Ladner, 210 Miss. 863 at 884, 50 S. (2d) 615 (1951),
the court stated that "any distinction between jurisdiction founded upon doing business
in a state which involves danger to life or property or state regulation, and on the other
hand contractual obligations arising out of such business, is artificial and not consistent
with the principle or policy of the statutes and foregoing decisions." Although this case
did not involve a single isolated act within the state, it is significant in respect to the
rejection of the view that a dangerous activity was necessary to support jurisdiction.
23 Query: Suppose plaintiff's claim had been for $75 rather than $7,500 and defendant
had resided in California rather than Wisconsin?
24 Cf. factors considered in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., note 2 supra; Gulf
Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 at 510 (1947).
25 See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, note 24 supra, at 510. See also Joiner, "Let's Have
Michigan Torts Decided in Michigan Courts,'' 31 MrCH. STATE B. J. 5 at 11-12 Gan.
1952).
26 Since defendant apparently never left Wisconsin, jurisdiction over him was based
solely on the application of respondeat superior. It might be argued that this factor should
at least go on the constitutional scales as one element of the "fairness" of subjecting him
to Illinois jurisdiction. The court inferentially rejected the argument by not mentioning it.

448

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 56

It is clear, however, that this decision does not predicate jurisdiction on
the fact of defendant's liability in tort, but rather interprets the statutory
words, "commission of a tortious act," as basing jurisdiction on the acts
or omissions of a defendant from which liability may or may not ultimately be found. 27 Such an interpretation is necessary, for if a tort itself were
the basis of jurisdiction, after being found liable in Illinois the defendant
could relitigate the entire question of liability in a challenge of the Illinois
court's jurisdiction when plaintiff brought suit on his judgment in Wisconsin.28 By avoiding this construction and by applying the "fairness" test
in upholding the constitutionality of the statute as applied to defendant, the
court provided a formidable protection for the residents of Illinois against
the possibility that they will be deprived of adequate redress when nonresident defendants leave the state.29
]. Martin Cornell

27 Principal case at 681. See also Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., note 20
supra, where the court appeared to construe the statutory words "commits a tort" as not
basing jurisdiction on the ultimate fact of liability in tort.
28 The Full Faith and Credit Clause permits a collateral attack on the jurisdictional
basis of a sister state's judgment. Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. (85 U.S.) 457 (1873).
29 See generally O'Connor and Goff, "Expanded Concepts of State Jurisdiction over
Non-Residents: The Illinois Revised Practice Act," 31 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 223 (1956).

